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AMERICAN-ARAB ANTI-DISCRIMINATION v. RENO
70 E3d 1045 (9th Cir. 1995)
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
I. FACTS
The Immigration and Naturalization Service
("INS") arrested six resident aliens' after initiating
deportation proceedings against them. The aliens
were charged pursuant to the ideological provisions
of the McCarran-Walter Act of 19522 ("the Act',
which provided for the deportation of aliens who
advocated or who were affiliated with any organi-
zation advocating communism.3 The charges tar-
geted their membership in the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine ("PFLP"), an alleged com-
munist organization. The aliens were also charged
with non-ideological immigration violations.4 Ini-
tially, they challenged the constitutionality of the
statute. They claimed that the statute was overbroad,
in violation of their First Amendment rights. Prior
to the district court's hearing on a motion for a pre-
liminary injunction, the INS dropped the ideologi-
cal charges against the plaintiffs' but retained the
non-ideological violation charges. At trial, the gov-
ernment argued that aliens do not enjoy First
Amendment rights in the deportation setting.6 The
district court disagreed, noting the long history of
case law affording aliens within the United States
First Amendment protection. 7 Furthermore, depor-
I Aiad Barakat, Naim Nadim Sharif, Bashar Amer,
Ayman Obeid, Julie Mungai, and Amjad Obeid were col-
lectively referenced as "the Six". Because of practical con-
straints, this case comment will address only the selective
enforcement claims of these six petitioners. The case also
held that the use of undisclosed dassified information in
legalization proceedings violated due process.
28 U.S.C. §§ 1251(a)(6) (D), (F-H) (1988).
38 U.S.C. §§ 1251(a)(6) (D), (F-0-I).
48 U.S.C. §§ 1251(a)(2, 9).
sAmerican-Arab Anti-Discrim. Com. v. Reno, 70 F.3d
1045, 1053 (9th Cir. 1995).The ideological charges were
dropped for tactical reasons.
6American-ArabAnti-Discrim. Com. v. Meese, 714 F.
Supp. 1060, 1063 (C.D. Cal. 1989).
7 Aliens "within" the United States include
nonimmigrant aliens as well as permanent resident aliens.
Id. at 1074-1075. In fact, the Court of Appeals for Cali-
fornia has held that aliens within the United States enjoy
the benefits of the First, Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments. Id. at 1074 (citing Bridges v. Wixon, 326
U.S. 135 (1945)) (Murphy, J. concurring). Congress' ple-
nary power over immigration is not dispositive. See
Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952). In that
tation did not limit these rights.8 In determining
whether the McCarran Act was overbroad, the dis-
trict court considered whether it reached a substan-
tial amount of constitutionally protected speech.9
The challenged provisions of the McCarran Act pro-
scribed the writing, publishing, circulating, distrib-
uting, printing, displaying, and possessing material
advocating or teaching the prohibited doctrines. 0
The court could not equate these prohibited actions
with advocacy of imminent unlawful action." There-
fore, the court concluded that the McCarran Act
unlawfully reached speech protected by the First
Amendment.
2
The INS appealed the district court's decision.
On review, the Ninth Circuit held that although the
aliens had standing to challenge the McCarran-
Walter provisions, their constitutional challenges
were not ripe for review.13 Because the aliens no
longer faced charges under the challenged provisions
of the McCarran Act,14 they would not suffer hard-
ship ifjudicial determination were delayed. Further-
more, the court was faced with many unknown
facts.' For example, the court did not know whether
the aliens were actually members of the PFLP or
the nature of the specific acts they had committed
in violation of the challenged provisions. 6 The
case, the Supreme Court conceded the Government's ple-
nary immigration power in the substantive due process
area, but it refused to accord the same deference in the
First Amendment field.
8American-ArabAnti-Discrim. Com., 714 F. Supp. at
1063.
9Id. According to Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444
(1969), the government may only prohibit advocacy di-
rected toward inciting or producing imminent lawless ac-
tion which is likely to incite or produce such action.
'0 1d. at 1063.
" Id. at 1083.
'11d. at 1083-84.
11 American-Arab Anti-Discrim. Com. v. Thornburgh,
970 F.2d 501, 510 (9th Cir. 1991).
'4American-ArabAnti-Discrim. Com., 970 F.2d at 512.
The INS dropped the ideological charges against the six
petitioners but retained the non-ideological charges. In
fact, the government expressly disavowed any intention
of filing future charges against appellees under the chal-
lenged provisions.
Is970 F.2d at 510-511.
'6 id .at 511.
United States Supreme Court has indicated that,
without proper factual development in the record,
its exercise of jurisdiction is inappropriate. 17 Courts
should avoid deciding important and difficult con-
stitutional issues devoid of a factual context.'8 Simi-
larly, a judicial determination should be withheld
until it is clear that the suing parties are within the
scope of an act.' 9
In addition to the scant factual record, there
existed no previous interpretation or application of
the challenged provisions.2" Neither the INS nor the
courts have had the opportunity to interpret these
provisions or to establish a policy implementing
them.2' In essence, the Ninth Circuit would have to
interpret the statute, sua sponte and without the aid
of guiding principles, to determine whether the
aliens' membership in the PFLP was triggered by
the Act. To adjudicate the aliens' claims would un-
dermine the basic premise of the ripeness doctrine:
"the court would become entangled in an abstract
disagreement over administrative policy and would
interfere before any INS decision was made affect-
ing the parties in any concrete way."22 Therefore, the
issues were not fit for judicial determination.
Following the Court of Appeal's decision, the
aliens brought selective enforcement claims2 in dis-
trict court. They claimed that the INS had singled
them out for selective enforcement of the immigra-
tion laws because of their membership in an alleg-
edly communist organization. 24 The district court
granted summary judgment on the selective enforce-
ment claims.25 The court also preliminarily enjoined
further deportation proceedings against the aliens,
and the government appealed. 26
II. HOLDING
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's
preliminary injunction enjoining deportation pro-
ceedings against the aliens. The Court of Appeals
agreed that the aliens had presented a prima facie
claim of selective enforcement. To establish a prima
facie case of selective enforcement, claimants must
1" Id. (citing W.E.B. DuBois Clubs of Am. v. Clark,






2American-ArabAnti-Discrim. Com. v. Reno, 70 F3d
at 1052. A selective enforcement claim is the immigra-
tion equivalent of a criminal selective prosecution claim.
prove that (1) others similarly situated have not been
prosecuted or "disparate impact" and (2) the pros-
ecution is based on an impermissible motive or"dis-
criminatory intent."2' The aliens proved that others
similarly situated had not been prosecuted. There-
fore, the immigration laws were being enforced
against them discriminatingly. They also proved that
their prosecution was based on an impermissible mo-
tive-retaliation for the constitutionally protected
freedom of association.
III. ANALYSIS/APPLICATION
The Ninth Circuit had to determine whether
the district court abused its discretion when it is-
sued the preliminary injunction and whether the
circumstances of the case warranted the preliminary
injunction.'8 A preliminary injunction is considered
appropriate "where plaintiffs show either a likeli-
hood of success on the merits and the possibility of
irreparable injury, or that serious questions going to
the merits were raised and the balance of hardships
tips sharply in their favor."29
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that
the district's court issuance of the preliminary in-
junction was based on sound legal standards and find-
ings of facts. The aliens satisfied both elements of a
selective enforcement claim. Crucial to the analysis
was the establishment of the appropriate control
group. The district court selected as a control group
those aliens who had either violated non-ideologi-
cal provisions or were associated with terrorist or-
ganizations whose views the government tolerates.
The control group consisted of people similarly situ-
ated, in all respects, to aliens except for the attribute
on which their claims rested-affiliation with gov-
ernmentally disfavored political views. The
government's evidence included prosecution of in-
dividuals who had actually committed terrorist acts,
rather than persons merely associated with terrorist
organizations.30 In essence, the court heard no evi-
dence that the INS had ever prosecuted persons simi-
larly situated to appellees. Therefore, the district





29 Id. at 1062 (citing Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Phoenix
Control Sys&, Inc., 886 F.2d 1173, 1174 (9th Cir. 1989)).
3OId. at 1063. Appellees have never been charged with
participating in terrorist activity.
court's conclusion that the aliens presented prima
facie evidence of disparate impact was not clearly
erroneous.
3'
The second element of a selective enforce-
ment claim requires proof of an impermissible
motive. Evidence of the government's impermis-
sible motive included former FBI director Will-
iam Webster's testimony to Congress.32 He testi-
fied that the aliens were arrested because of their
membership in the PFLP.3 3 Webster also stated
that if these individuals had been United States
citizens, they could not have been arrested; for
citizens are permitted to belong to unfavorable
organizations like the PFLP.34 "[The] Government
cannot deny rights and privileges solely because
of a citizen's association with an unpopular orga-
nization."3s Therefore, prosecuting aliens for
membership activity, lawfully exercised by citi-
zens, constituted an impermissible motive.
The court used the Brandenbur 6 test as the
guiding principle for determining the lawfulness of
the government's prohibition on appellees' First
Amendment rights.37 However, the government did
not attempt to illustrate the aliens' satisfaction or
failure of the Brandenburg standard. Rather, the gov-
ernment expounded its view that First Amendment
rights did not extend to aliens residing in the United
States who are subject to deportation proceedings.
38
The government failed to convince the Ninth Cir-






'5 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (delin-
eating the standard for what constitutes permissible and
impermissible speech).
WAmerican-ArabAnti-Discrim., 70 F.3d at 1063.
38Id.
391d. at 1064-66.
40Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945).
4' See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259,
271(1990); Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590,
596-97 (1953).
42 American-Arab Anti-Discrim., 70 F3d at 1064.
43Bridges, 326 U.S. at 138. Bridges was charged un-
der 8 U.S.C. § 137.The statute defined as deportable any
alien who was "at the time of entering the United States,
or has been at any time thereafter" a member of or affili-
ated with an organization of the character attributed to
the Communist Party.
44 Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. at 144.
4 1 Id. The record showed that the government de-
fined "affiliation" such that it encompassed neutral mem-
other cases4" to illustrate this country's long stand-
ing practice of affording aliens within the United
States First Amendment protection.
4 2
In Bridges, the Court reversed a deportation or-
der ofplaintiff Harry Bridges, allegedly affiliated with
the Communist Party.4 3 The court believed that the
deportation order erroneously rested on two factors.
First, the government misconstrued the term "affili-
ation" within the statute under which Bridges was
charged. 4 The government gave "affiliation" a mean-
ing broader than the statute permitted.41 Second,
Bridges was subject to an unfair hearing before the
order was issued.4 6 In a concurring opinion, Justice
Murphy focused on the court's history of intoler-
ance of inequitable treatment of resident aliens.
47
Justice Murphy thought that once an alien had law-
fully entered and resided in this country, he was pro-
tected by the First and the Fifth Amendments and
by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 48 These constitutional provisions ap-
ply to all "persons" and guard against any encroach-
ment by federal or state authority.4 9 In a later case,"
Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding,0 the Court stated that
resident aliens were, indeed, entitled to constitu-
tional protection under the First, Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments and that these provisions make
no distinction between citizens and resident aliens.5'
Currently, Justice Murphy's Bridges concurrence is
the majority view with respect to resident aliens'
rights.
bership activities, for example, assisting in the enterprises
of an organization and securing members for it. Id. The
proper construction of affiliation requires an adherence
to or a furtherance of the purposes or objectives of the
proscribed organization. Id. "Affiliation," in the Court's
opinion, was distinguishable from mere cooperation with
the organization's lawful activities. Id.
461d. at 150-51. Highly incriminating statements ap-
peared in therecord about Bridges' membership in the
Communist party. Even though government regulations
made these statements inadmissable and Bridges repeat-
edly objected to their admissibility, they were, nonethe-





-5 Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1952).
s' 344 U.S. at 596. Kwong Hai Chew, was an alien
and lawful permanent resident of the United States. He
was detained while returning from a voyage as a seaman
on a vessel of American registry. The Attorney General
ordered his detention and temporarily excluded him from
the United States. Chew was deemed an alien whose en-
try was prejudicial to the public interest. Petitioner was
ordered permanently excluded without notice of the
The government set forth a series of arguments
to rebut the Ninth Circuit's finding that the resi-
dent aliens were entitled to the full range of First
Amendment rights.52 Their most compelling argu-
ment was that Congress' plenary power over immi-
gration matters allowed limiting the First Amend-
ment protection of aliens facing deportation.5 3 The
court recognized that Congress and the President
possessed virtually unfettered discretion to regulate
aliens' admission into this country-s4 At the same
time, however, Congress' power to deport a resi-
dent alien was a more restrained power, subject to
constitutional constraints.5s
The United States Supreme Court has consis-
tently distinguished between aliens within the
United States and those attempting to enter from
outside the country.56 "The Bill of Rights is a futile
authority for the alien seeking admission for the first
time to these shores. But once an alien lawfully en-
ters and resides in this country he becomes invested
with the rights guaranteed by the Constitution to
all people within our borders."57 The Court has ac-
knowledged this longstanding distinction between
resident aliens and those seeking entry, characteriz-
ing it as a difference between unprotected status at
the threshold of admission and the protected status
within the national community 8 Although use of
summary processes and procedures is appropriate
in an exclusion determination, the same is not true
of a deportation proceeding. The government's ar-
gument failed because the appellees in this case were
resident aliens facing deportation, not exclusion.
Hence, they were entitled to the full protection of
the First Amendment even in the face of deporta-
tion. 9
After a review of the district court's decision to
issue a preliminary injunction against the govern-
ment, the circuit court found that the district court
did not base its decision on an erroneous legal stan-
dard or on clearly erroneous findings of fact. The
aliens' First Amendment rights were subject to ir-
reparable harm because of the government's unavail-
charges against him and without the opportunity to be
heard. The Court held that his detention was unlawful.
Id. at 603.
S2American-ArabAnti-Discrim., 70 E3d at 1064-1066.




S7Bridges, 326 U.S. at 161.
S"Ainerican-ArabAnti-Discrim., 70 F.3d at 1065.
59 Id.
ing attempt to prosecute them. ° Furthermore, pe-
titioners had a strong likelihood of success on their
claim that the INS had selectively enforced the im-
migration laws in retaliation for their exercise of their
right to associate.6' Thus, the circuit court held, the
district court did not abuse its discretion in prelimi-
nary enjoining deportation proceedings against the
aliens.62
IV. CONCLUSION
Aliens within the United States are afforded
protection under the First Amendment and the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. These
rights are applicable even in the deportation con-
text. Neither the Constitution nor the courts have
ever made entitlement to these protections depen-
dent on an individual's legal status as an alien or a
citizen. This court, along with its predecessors, as-
sumes that aliens physically within the borders of
our country want to remain in the United States,
not only to reap the benefits of a democratic soci-
ety, but to contribute to it as well. In fact, "[t]he
Framers explicitly recognized that aliens within this
country participate in a reciprocal relationship of
societal obligations and correlative protection."'
The United States is viewed as a melting pot,
and this image continues as the number of incom-
ing aliens grows. Having diverse cultures within our
country is an attirbute mportant to American cul-
ture. Throughout the opinion, the Ninth Circuit
made several references to our "national commu-
nity," reflecting a general desire and acceptance of
people of different cultures who want to contribute
to and be a part of our society. Perhaps courts like
the Ninth Circuit are trying to undo the past wrongs
consistently and unfairly visited upon aliens.64 The
judiciary's vehement intolerance for alien discrimi-
nation can be equated to the same intolerance it has
for racial discrimination. Blacks, like aliens, have been
subjected to private as well as governmental discrimi-
nation. The longtime and consistently inequitable
60 d at 1066.
61 Id.
63 Id. at 1065.
r1 Id. Aliens have been subjected to intolerant and
harassing conduct in our past, particularly in times of cri-
ses. For example, Congress authorizes the President to
expel "all such aliens as he shall judge dangerous to the
peace and safety of the United States". See Alien Enemies
Act of 1798, Act of June 25, 1798, ch.58, I Stat, 570,
571.
treatment of blacks resulted in the creation of com-
prehensive federal and local anti-discrimination
models, such as Title VII and affirmative action pro-
grams. These programs, some of which protect
against alien discrimination, are pervasive in our
society. The Ninth Circuit in this case simply fol-
lowed precedent and ensured that our national com-
munity remains intact. In light of the United States
Supreme Court's unfettered insistence on affording
aliens physically within our borders core constitu-
tional rights, the legislation recently passed which
expedites deportation proceedings is likely to en-
counter significant resistance.
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